Most employment mobility takes place at the beginning of the individual's employment career. Individuals need this mobility to learn the conditions of the market and find a job that best matches their qualifications with their wages. We regard the "intifada," which triggered a severe recession in Israel in [2001][2002][2003] and dampened demand for labor in all industries except security services, as an exogenous shock to the labor market. This shock transformed the security-services industry, which until then had provided temporary employment for pre-professional population groups, into a source of long-term, long-hours employment. Our research hypothesis is that the lengthy employment in this industry, occasioned by the weakness of the labor market, deprived the cohort of young adults who joined it during the intifada of "healthy" mobility elsewhere in the economy. Consequently, the careers of members of this cohort were diverted to a flatter path of wage growth than the career paths of young adults who joined the security-services industry before the intifada and eventually left it for jobs in other industries.
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A. Introduction
Mobility of workers in the labor market (hereinafter: employment mobility) takes place mainly at the beginning of the individual's employment career. In a worker's first ten years in the labor market, he or she holds, on average, two-thirds of all jobs that s/he will have in the course of her/his employment career (Topel and Ward, 1992) . The rate of increase in wage during the first years of one's career is central in the process that leads to employment stability (Bougheas and Georgellis, 2004) . The premises of the matching model (Medoff and Abraham, 1980; Barmby and Eberth, 2008) are that a successful match between workers and employers will be manifested in long worker longevity in the labor market, an increase in the worker's wage when s/he switches jobs, the accumulation of human capital in each job held, and a decrease in the employment-mobility rate as longevity in the labor market is accrued (Groot and Verberne, 1997) .
The underlying question in the study that follows is whether the tendency of workers at the beginning of their employment careers to stay at one job at length may place them on an inferior career path in the sense of lower earnings and a weaker connection with the labor market. Using an exogenous shock that stimulated demand for guards and other security-service workers, we test the argument that the limitation of employment mobility at the beginning of one's career may lead to an inferior path later in one's working life.
Over the years, the low occupational requirements for security guards often resulted in the employment of elderly, poorly schooled workers who received nothing but incomplete and rudimentary security training. Consequently, the monthly wage of those who work in the security-services industry is less than half the national average wage and a large majority of such workers earn the minimum wage. Since the job does not require complex training, employment in this industry also attracts people who are at the outset of their employment careers either when they have just been discharged from the mandatory military service, before taking vocational training or beginning academic studies, or are working part-time during their undergraduate studies. For this reason, young people who accept jobs in this industry usually do so for short periods of time.
In September 2000, security in Israel was undermined after several years of relative peace and quiet. From then until the middle of 2003, there was a perceptible 3 increase in the number of terror attacks. This period is known as the "second" or "AlAqsa" intifada (hereinafter: the intifada). As the armed confrontation with the Palestinians escalated, global economic activity slowed and the ICT industries tumbled into an acute crisis. Due to these factors, Israeli economic activity contracted (by 2.7 percent and 2.6 percent in per-capita GDP in 2001 and 2002, respectively) .
Given the steadily worsening recession and the increase in unemployment at this time As stated, the empirical strategy that we will invoke to estimate the effect of the lack of employment mobility on later career stages is the use of an exogenous shock, as we term the intifada, on a cohort of young adults who joined the security-services industry as against a cohort of those who joined the industry several years before.
Since, however, the intifada coincided with and worsened a recession, it is necessary to separate the effect of the security shock from that of the macroeconomic situation, which, of course, is itself known as a source of long-lasting or permanent damage to the earning trajectory of the cohort that has the misfortune of joining the labor market during it (Oreopoulos et al., 2006; Kodrzycki, 2007) . To distinguish between the two effects, we use the geographic variance of terror incidents because the securityservices industry is a local one and differences in the intensity and frequency of terror attacks created differential demand for security guards. The effect of the recession, in contrast, was countrywide and did not correlate with the geographic variance of the intensity of terror.
Thus, the current study attempts to examine and answer the following four questions: (a) Was the cohort that joined the security-services industry during the 4 intifada (hereinafter: the "intifada cohort") more strongly connected to the industry than those who joined it previously (hereinafter: the "pre-intifada cohort")? (b) Did the pre-intifada cohort display greater employment mobility than the intifada cohort?
(c) Is the intifada cohort less connected with the labor market than the pre-intifada cohort? (d) Is there a difference in earning horizon between the pre-intifada cohort and the intifada cohort?
The rest of the study is organized as follows: Section B reviews the theoretical background, centering on open questions about employment at outset of career and employment mobility. Section C describes the characteristics of terrorism in Israel in [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . Section D presents the data and defines the research population. Section E offers descriptive statistics. Section F explains the econometric model. Section G shows the empirical findings of the estimation and Section H concludes.
B. Theoretical Background
Economic research shows that most job-switching takes place at the beginning of the individual's employment career. According to Topel and Ward (1992) , about twothirds of job-switching in the lifetime of American male high-school graduates occurs in the first ten years of work. Booth et al. (1999) find that British men and women hold five jobs during their lives, on average, and that half of their total job-switching takes place in their first ten years of employment. 1 Groot and Verberne (1997) find that the rate of job switching depends negatively on worker's age. To support this contention, we note that Hall (1982) found that from age thirty onward, half of men and one-fourth of women in the United States in the 1970s held one job for more than twenty years.
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Numerous empirical studies found that employment mobility decreases with longevity in the labor market (e.g., Groot and Verberne, 1997; Romanov and Zussman, 2003; Hammida, 2004; Ghosh, 2007) .
Just as most job switching takes place at the beginning of the individual's occupational career, so does most of the increase in wage. Murphy and Welch (1990) 1 Finney and Kohlhase (2008) find that workers switch jobs more rapidly at the beginning of their careers if they live in areas typified by higher levels of schooling. 2 Oreopoulos et al. (2006) tested the effect of economic crises and shocks on the employment-mobility rate (with a breakdown by industry) and found that an initial increase takes place (on average), followed by a mild downturn.
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found that 70-80 percent of the growth rate of American workers' wages occurs in the worker's first ten years in the labor market; Topel and Ward (1992) argue similarly.
Economic research is of two minds about the extent of influence of employment mobility on wage. Borjas (1981) found a positive return to employment mobility among firms. Keith and McWilliams (1997) , in contrast, found no difference whatsoever in the rate of wage increase as a dependency on worker's employment mobility. However, Light and McGarry (1998) , Hammida (2004) , Munasinghe and Sigman (2004) , and Miranda (2005) found that workers who switch jobs regularly have a lower wage trajectory than those who switch jobs less frequently. 3 These differences may originate in heterogeneity in unobserved traits, including predisposition to mobility and the utility of job switching; the latter is familiar in the context of employment mobility as the movers-stayers model (e.g., Frydman, 1984; Sampson, 1990; Dutta et al., 2001; Kettunen, 2002) .
C. Characteristics of Terrorism in Israel: the Second Intifada 4
In September 1993, Israel concluded the Declaration of Principles on Interim SelfGovernment Arrangements (the "Oslo accord"), which brought the Palestinian authority into being. The initial period after this event was typified by a perceptible decrease in the intensity of violent resistance action against Israel by the Palestinian terror organizations. An upturn in the number of liquidation actions against wanted persons in the Palestinian Authority areas caused major disruption to the relative calm as a number of large-scale terror operations took place in a small geographic area (five attacks, three attacks, and one attack in Israel, within pre-1967 Israel, within pre- borders, in 1997 Israel, within pre- , 1998 Israel, within pre- , and 1999 . The period between 1999 and September 2000 was largely calm on the security front, evidently in view of diplomatic efforts at that time to promote the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
After the array of diplomatic processes collapsed in September 2000, terror struck Israel once again, in what has been termed the "Al-Aqsa intifada" or the "second intifada." At first, most of the terror attacks occurred in the Jerusalem Subdistrict. As time passed, however, the pace the attacks quickened and their spread widened. No longer were they confined to the Jerusalem area; they now struck towns in the central area (Netanya, Kefar Sava), Haifa, Tel Aviv, and even the north ( Figure   2 ). 
D. Data and Research Population
For the purposes of our study, a database was constructed by blending various (
1) Research Population
The study is focused on young men newly joining the security-services industry. An important goal of our study is to demonstrate the extent of employment mobility of those who worked in the security-services industry when they joined the labor market and in the other industries where they continued to develop their careers after leaving the security-services industry. Accordingly, we have to study those who newly joined the industry at the relevant time as opposed to those who were already working as security guards.
The research subjects were men aged 20-30 in their year of entry to the industry.
We imposed this age limit due to our wish to focus on the initial career years, which, for most men in this industry, are the first half of their twenties, after they finish military service and/or are in the middle of academic studies. Persons employed in the security-services industry who died within three years of having joined it were omitted from this population. In all, then, the research population comprises 85,211 persons who were newly hired as security guards: 44,975 in the pre-intifada cohort and 40,236 in the intifada cohort.
(2) Data
Information about employment in the security-services industry was culled from a 
E. Descriptive Statistics
The average (median) age of newly hired security guards aged 20-30 was found to be 23.7 (23), showing that this market provides, in most cases, employment after mandatory military service, which (Jewish) men finish at age 21.
The share of persons who continued working in the security-services industry among those who had started working in the industry in the first surveillance year declined steadily as time passed (to 23% in Surveillance Year 4) among members of both cohorts: pre-intifada and the intifada (Table 1) . Concurrently, the share of persons holding at least one post in other industries, increased in both cohorts investigated, but among the pre-intifada cohort the rate was higher (75.3% against 69.8%).
The average number of jobs held in the security-services industry annually was 1.2, with no trend of change during the four-year window of time investigated, among workers in both cohorts (Table 2 , Part I). However, employment of the same individuals in other industries was typified by greater mobility, which diminished during the surveillance period: from 1.91 jobs in Surveillance Year 2 to 1.73 jobs in Surveillance Year 4 among members of the pre-intifada cohort and from 1.82 to 1.72, respectively, among members of the intifada cohort. In terms of total jobs held, the 9 pre-intifada cohort displayed greater mobility (a statistically significant difference) than the intifada cohort in all surveillance years.
Examining the extent of employment, in terms of the number of months worked by industry, we find that members of the intifada cohort displayed a higher frequency of full-year employment (9-12 months of work during the year) than those in the preintifada cohort, who more typically worked for short periods of time (1-4 months during the year); this result was obtained in the three last surveillance years (Table 3) .
Comparing the average number of months worked in the other industries, we find a statistically significant difference in favor of the pre-intifada cohort in all years investigated (8.9 months of work on average per year as against 8.5, calculated over three years) ( Table 2 , Part II).
Since the wage data used in the study provide no information about hours with the increase in wage in other industries relative to that of security guards. The proportion of wage originating in the security-services industry proves to be higher among members of the intifada cohort starting from the year following that of entry to the industry. This is evidently explained by longer hours worked and the payment of a risk premium during the intifada years.
F. Econometric Model
To determine whether workers' tendency to stay at one workplace for long at the beginning of their careers may impede their career development and future earnings, we estimate several econometric models.
Using an OLS and a maximum-likelihood duration analysis model, we estimate the likelihood that individual i would be employed in the security-services industry in year t. The implicit question is whether workers hired by this industry during the intifada spent more time working in this industry than those in the pre-intifada cohort did. The estimate is based on an accumulation of years in which the individual worked in the security-services industry, from year of entry (t 1 ) to the end of the surveillance year being estimated:
(1) is supposed to catch a higher frequency of academic studies among members of the intifada cohort, relatively to that of the pre-intifada cohort, in accordance with anecdotal evidence that during the years of intifada and sluggish labor market many young men opted to start their academic studies; those studies would be postponed if the labor market offered then more attractive opportunities.
The employment mobility in other industries of workers who were hired as security guards is based on the accumulation of years in which the individual held jobs in all other industries from the year following his first year in the securityservices industry (t 2 ) to the end of the surveillance year being estimated. Employment mobility is estimated by model (2), The connection-with-labor-market parameter is based on the accumulation of years in which the individual held jobs in security services and other industries, from the year following his/her first year of work as a security guard (t 2 ) to the end of three years thereafter, the surveillance year being estimated (t 4 ). Connection with the labor market is estimated in the following way: 
MonthOth
Number of months worked in other industries in successive surveillance years (t=t 2 ,t 3 ,t 4 )
HighEduc it
Higher studies in surveillance year 
W it
Monthly wage (annual wage divided by number of months in all industries) in all jobs during surveillance year t=t 2 ,t 3 ,t 4 
MonthAvgSec it
Average annual number of months worked in security services, from first year of work in security services to end of surveillance year
MonthAvgOth it
Average annual number of months worked in other industries, from year following first year of work in security services to end of surveillance year
JobsAvgSec it
Average annual number of jobs in security services, from first year of work in security services to end of surveillance year
JobsAvgOth it
Average annual number of jobs in other industries, from year following first year of work in security services to end of surveillance year
HighEduc it
Higher studies in surveillance year
The terror factor had a rapid effect on demand for security guards. Its effect on wage, however, was manifested at a slight lag due to inelasticity in the wage-setting mechanism and the small marginal increase in new guards' wage relative to existing guards' wages.
The most interesting variable in each of the estimation equations is the intifada indicator (0 for individuals who belong to the "pre-intifada" cohort, 1 for the "intifada" cohort). This variable tells us whether employment patterns differ significantly as a dependency on the time of hiring. On the basis of the propositions presented thus far, we may assume that the sign of the effect of the intifada variable will be positive in the estimation of security-services employment and negative in the estimation of employment in other industries. Its aggregate effect on wage is expected to be negative because employment mobility should lead to a higher trajectory of wage and total months worked (extent of employment in all industries).
G. Empirical Findings
Tables 4-8 present estimates of the likelihood of protracted employment in the security-services industry, employment mobility among security guards, the strength of security guards' connection with the labor market, the extent of their employment, and their wage equation, as a dependency on the time at which the individual enters the security-guard market.
14 The likelihood of protracted employment in the security-services industry was estimated by means of an OLS and a maximum-likelihood survival-function model.
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The results appear in Table 4 .
The estimates show a positive correlation between a worker's age and the number of months that he worked in all security-service jobs in each of the three years following the first year of security-service work. Jewish workers who were hired by this industry were found to have accumulated more months of work than Arabs and others.
Newly hired security guards who immigrated to Israel in or after 1989 worked more hours, all other factors constant. The positive correlation between these variables was found to trend upward as time passed after the worker joined the security-services industry.
Undergraduate studies had a positive effect on the number of months worked in the security-services industry. This, in our opinion, is due to the prevalent nature of employment in the security-services market, which permits flexible work hours, when studies may be pursued. The positive correlation between these variables was found to trend downward as time passed after the beginning of work in the security services.
This may be explained in the tendency of persons who work in this industry to leave the industry as their level of schooling rises and the access to jobs that have higher professional status improves. Indeed, if the average age of the research population is 23.7 (in the first year of work in the industry), and the mode age upon completion of first-degree studies in Israel is 26, then the average member of the research population reached Surveillance Year 3 at the end of his studies (if he studied, of course)-the stage in life when one seeks a professional job and stops working as a security guard.
In contrast, higher studies during the intifada are found to reduce the number of months worked in security-service jobs. One may explain this finding by noting the large number of hours that security guards were required to put in at the time (relative to the pre-intifada period). This dissuaded many students who had considered working as security guards to accept such jobs at that time, because the requirement of lengthy working hours would have shortened time that they could invest in studies (see Figure   3 ).
Joining the security-services industry during the intifada increased the number of months worked in all security-service jobs in each of the three years after the year of entry. This result, beyond that presented in Table 3 , provides evidence that persons newly hired in the security-services industry during the intifada held these jobs longer than persons newly hired before the intifada.
Now we analyze the question of employment mobility after the year of entry to the security-services industry. To answer this question, we estimate an employmentmobility equation that examines the total number of jobs held in all other industries from the year after the first year in the security-services industry. Table 5 presents the results.
Being married at the time of entry to the security-services industry reduces the number of jobs that a worker hold in other industries, i.e., married workers are less mobile than single ones, as one would expect since they have a stronger economic commitment to their families. The negative relation gathers strength during the years in which the individual works as a security guard.
Estimates of the "total jobs in security-services industry" variable point to a substitution effect between working in this industry and working in other industries.
The extent of the substitution rises in tandem with the amount of time that passes after one joins the security-services industry. Thus, in Surveillance Year 2, holding another job in the security-services industry reduced the number of jobs held in other industries by one-third of a job, whereas the ratio was roughly 1:2 in the following two years.
To find out whether lengthier employment in the year of entry to the securityservices industry leaves a "scar" on employment mobility in subsequent years, we added to the estimation equation the number of months worked in the securityservices industry in the year of entry to the industry. The estimates show that the extent of employment in security services in the first year has a negative effect on the number of jobs held in other industries in subsequent years, controlling for the contribution of mobility among security-services firms. This effect is quite strong:
adding six months of work in the security services in the year of entry to this industry reduces the number of jobs held outside the industry three years later by more than half a job.
Undergraduate studies among security guards during the intifada reduced the number of future jobs held in other industries. This finding may trace to inelasticity in 16 people's ability to combine their work with studies in view of the long hours that security guards had to put in at that time. Interestingly, higher studies were not found to have a significant effect of their own; the only effect found was in interaction with the intifada period, which, as expected, had a dampening effect on employment mobility. Consequently, apart from the temporary shock that coincided with the period of compromised security, students displayed no unusual pattern of employment mobility relative to other members of the research population.
Joining the security-services industry during the intifada had an even stronger downward effect on employment mobility outside the industry in the subsequent three years. The effect of the intifada added up to about one-fourth of a job in the first two years of the surveillance period.
We estimated the strength of an individual's connection with the labor market by means of an OLS and a maximum-likelihood duration analysis estimation. The model examined the number of months worked in all security-service and other jobs, from the year following the year of entry to the security-services industry to the end of the three years thereafter. Table 6 Higher studies increased the number of months worked in all industries. This finding is congruent with the well-known fact that persons with academic schooling have a higher labor-force participation rate and a larger labor supply than persons with secondary and post-secondary schooling. Another possible explanation for these findings is that most persons who work as security guards regard their employment in this industry as temporary and tend to leave it once their level of schooling rises and their access to jobs that have higher professional status improves. In contrast, we found that higher studies during the intifada reduced the number of hours worked in all industries. The explanation evidently traces to the inferior terms of employment at that time, which deprived students who wished to combine work and study of the 17 possibility of doing so because of the lengthy hours that security guards had to put in during the intifada.
We found that the cohort of persons who were hired as security guards during the intifada worked fewer months in all jobs, in all industries, than the cohort that had been hired for security work before the intifada. One may propose two explanations for this outcome: (1) strong demand for security-service jobs during the intifada (relative to the pre-intifada period; see Figure 1 ) and (2) a dearth of non-securityservice jobs during the intifada. These two factors have opposite effects on the number of months worked by those employed (the first-positive; the secondnegative). By implication, the effect of the latter factor surpasses that of the former.
Estimating an individual's connection to the labor market does not allow us, as
shown above, to estimate the extent of his employment in other industries each year.
This is because we do not know the extent of employment in the other industries in year t 1 , for which reason we cannot measure the cumulative continuation of employment in the other industries. Therefore, we estimated an equation of employment in the other industries for each surveillance year, starting with the year following that of entry to the security-services industry. Table 7 presents the results.
The estimates in the table show that joining the security-services industry during the intifada reduced the number of months worked in other industries. This finding, combined with that shown in Table 4 
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The estimates of the terror index in the worker's geographic subdistrict of residence in the year preceding the surveillance year show, as expected, that terror intensity has a negative effect on the extent of employment in other industries.
Finally, we used the wage equations in Table 8 to examine the effect of the timing of enlistment in the security-services industry and the extent of employment mobility on total wage. The equations were estimated in the year following the first year of security-service employment and in the two subsequent years.
The estimates in Table 8 show that joining the security-services industry during the intifada depressed the wages of those who did this in the year following the year of entry by 8 percent relative to those who joined the industry before the intifada (Column 1). This outcome did not recur in the two subsequent years, resulting in the formation of a negative wage gap that came to 9 percent in Surveillance Year 4
(Column 3). One may explain this outcome on the basis of the results presented previously showing that those who joined the security-services industry during the intifada had less employment mobility than the pre-intifada cohort and that the other industries paid higher monthly average wages than security services throughout the investigation period.
The number of months worked in an industry-security services or other-had a positive effect on wage, in accordance with the well-known positive relation between the quality of a worker's match with the employer and his wage. The more time passed after an individual joined the security-services industry, the stronger the effect of both factors on the individual's wage became, as the difference in the strength of the effect attributed to the two estimates grew steadily in favor of working in other industries. When we asked whether a worker's wage depends on the extent of his mobility in the labor market, we found a negative relation between the two components, both in the average number of jobs that the individual held over the years in security services and for this parameter in the other industries. This outcome reinforces the findings of Light and McGarry (1998 ), Hammida (2004 ), Munasinghe and Sigman (2004 ), and Miranda (2005 .
Higher studies were found to have a negative effect on wage whether the individual was hired before or during the intifada. This result may trace to the time constraint that individuals face at that time in choosing between employment and studies, the employment of students, and the relatively small number of hours (reflected in the level of the monthly wage).
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The estimation of the wage equation elicited several additional findings. The worker's age had a positive effect on his wage, Jews earned more than Arabs, and married workers out-earned single workers. The index of terror in the worker's geographic subdistrict of residence in the year before the surveillance year had a negative effect on his/her wage at the time. The marginal effect stood at roughly 1 percent in the three years, i.e., a unit increase in the terror index reduced the monthly wage by 1 percent-a negligible effect relative to that of the intifada cohort (in Surveillance Years 2-4).
H. Conclusion
Although employment mobility in the labor market takes place throughout a worker's employment career, economic research shows that most mobility occurs at the beginning of one's career. This study examined the economic implications of a deviation from this norm at the beginning of workers' employment careers and attempted to determine whether a decrease in mobility is harmful to workers' advancement and earning levels in the labor market. Because of the endogeneity of employment mobility to the continuation of one's employment career, we investigated the matter by using an exogenous shock to demand for guards and security personnel which was brought about by the eruption of the intifada in Israel in late 2001.
The study found that when viewed from the perspective of all employee posts, the pre-intifada cohort had greater employment mobility and shorter-term employment in the security-services industry than the cohort of persons hired during the intifada, which was noted for holding security-services jobs uninterruptedly for a full year.
We found that the average monthly wage of security guards rose steadily over the years and that those hired during the intifada earned in the security services jobs more than those hired before it. Among persons who were employed as security guards, the average monthly wage in other industries in which they worked also increased steadily over the years, but the wages of those hired before the intifada surpassed the wages of those hired during the intifada.
The duration analysis estimates show that holding security-services jobs during the intifada increased the number of months worked in all jobs in that industry in each of the three years following the year of entry to the industry. This may indicate that 20 persons who were hired for security-services jobs during the intifada typically exhibited a longer employment in the industry than those hired before the intifadathereby limiting their employment mobility in the other industries.
We found a substitution effect between working in the security services and working in other industries and a negative correlation between the number of months worked by an individual in the security services in his year of entry to security work and the number of jobs held by the same person in other industries over the years.
The estimates of the connection-with-labor-market function show that the intifada cohort worked fewer months in all jobs in all industries than the pre-intifada cohort.
Our The terror index allows us to estimate the concept of "intensity of terror." Proposed by Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) , it weighs the number of terror incidence, the number of persons injured, and the number of persons killed during the period investigated. The value of 1 represents a time in which no terror incidents occurred in the subdistrict. 
Notes to table:
The explained variable is months worked (N) in all jobs in the security-services industry from year of entry to industry to the end of surveillance year (1, 2, or 3 years after the entry year) (limited to 24/36/48, respectively). The numbers in parentheses denote standard error. *, **, and ***, at statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) Number of years of higher schooling (first degree) in one or more years from year of entry to industry to end of surveillance year. 
The explained variable is total jobs held (N) in other industries from year following year of entry to security-services industry to end of surveillance year (1, 2, or 3 years after the entry year). The numbers in parentheses denote standard error. *, **, and ***, at statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) From year following year of entry to security-services industry to end of surveillance year.
(2) Number of years of higher schooling (first degree) in one or more of the years from year after entry industry to end of surveillance year. 
The explained variable is months worked (N) in all jobs in the security-services industry and in other industries, from year of entry to security-services industry to the end of three years thereafter (limited to 36). The numbers in parentheses denote standard error. *, **, and ***, at statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) Maximum-likelihood model of survival function, Weibull distribution.
(2) Number of years of higher schooling (first degree) in one or more years from the year after entry to security-services industry to end of three years thereafter. 
The explained variable is months worked (N) in other industries in surveillance year. The numbers in parentheses denote standard error. *, **, and ***, at statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The explained variable is (log) monthly wage in all jobs 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years after entry to security-services industry. The numbers in parentheses denote standard error. *, **, and ***, at statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
(1) From year of entry to security-services industry to end of surveillance year. (2) From year following entry to security-services industry to end of surveillance year.
